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CHURCH DISPUTES AND THE
COURTS
Church
Autonomy and Separation of Church
and State
Issue:
When
a
dispute arises
within a Christian or other church
(intra-church dispute), does government court have a legal right to
adjudicate
the dispute?
Answer:
Generally,
government courts may not interfere
with intra-church disputes relating to religious doctrine, discipline,
faith,
or internal organization. Serbian
Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 724-25 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679
(1872). Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
at 710; Maryland
& Va.
Churches v. SharpsburgChurch,
396 U.S.
367, 368 (1970); Presbyterian Church I v. Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969)
.
Why?
Ruling
on such
matters
would foster excessive
government "entanglement" with religion and, thus, violate the First
Amendment’s establishment clause and/or free exercise clause. Diocese
v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S.
696, 709,
713 (1976).
Note:
The First Amendment to
the United States
Constitution states that: "Congress
shall make no law
respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…"
Exceptions to Hands-Off Rule:
The
civil courts
may adjudicate a church-related dispute when the dispute can be
resolved by
applying “neutral
principles of law” without inquiry into religious
doctrine. Church property disputes
commonly fall under this category.
Further,
the U.S.Constitution
permits courts to inquire into matters involving churches and religious
issues
when crimes or torts
have occurred. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
602-604
(1979).
A
“tort” is
typically a
non-contractual civil wrong such
as, for example, assault, battery, defamation, negligence (auto
accidents, dog
bite, dangerous property conditions, etc.), professional malpractice,
and so
on.
Reason
for the
Exception:
Because religious organizations
are part of the civil community, they are subject to societal rules
governing
property rights,
torts, and criminal conduct.
The First Amendment does not excuse individuals or
religious groups from
complying with valid neutral laws. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Res.
v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
Examples:
Church Property
Disputes:
State
courts may
choose
various “methods” or approaches
to resolve church property disputes as long as the method a does not
violate
the First Amendment. Episcopal Church Cases,
45 Cal.4th 467 (2009).
Courts
typically
choose
between two tests for resolving
church property disputes:
(1)
“Highest
Church
Authority” Approach.
This
method requires civil courts to accept
as binding decisions made by the highest church self-governing
authority that
decided the matter (also known as the "highest church judicatory",
“principle of government” or "compulsory deference" approach; See
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 – seminal case on church
autonomy.
(2)
“Neutral
Principles of
Law.” This
method
requires civil courts to apply
the same general neutral legal principles to church property disputes
that
apply to other secular property disputes.
Which of these
two
approaches should a court use?
In
2009, the
California
Supreme Court stated that:
“…if
resolution
of the
property dispute involves a
doctrinal dispute, the court must defer to the position of the highest
ecclesiastical authority that has decided the doctrinal point.
But
to the extent
the court
can resolve the property
dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should use what the
United
States Supreme Court has called the ‘neutral principles of
law’
approach."
Episcopal
Church
Cases
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 467
What authority
and sources
of information should the
court use to decide the church property issue?
“The
court should
consider
sources such as the deeds to
the property in dispute, the local church's articles of incorporation,
the
general church's constitution [bylaws], canons, and rules, and relevant
[government] statutes, including statutes specifically concerning
religious
property, such as Corporations Code section 9142.” Episcopal
Church
Cases
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 467
Hierarchical
Church
Trust Agreements:
Numerous states have concluded that properly worded express trust
provisions
preclude a dissident majority of a local congregation from retaining
local
parish property for their own use after a vote to disaffiliate from a
denomination. See, e.g., Dixon v. Edwards,
290 F.3d 699, 716 (4th Cir.
2002);;
Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E.2d 920, 925 (N.Y.
2008);
Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Trinity-St. Michael’s Parish,
Inc. v.
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Conn., 620 A.2d 1280, 1285
(Conn.1993);
Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 688
N.E.2d 923,
931 (Mass. 1997); Episcopal Diocese of Mass. v. DeVine, 797 N.E.2d 916,
923
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
N.J. v.
Graves, 417 A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1980); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711,
718 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2003); Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982);
Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 P.2d 182, 183 (Nev. 1980).
Example:
Episcopal Church
Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467:
“We
conclude…that
the
general church, not the local
church, owns the property in question. Although the deeds to the
property have
long been in the name of the local church, that church agreed from the
beginning of its existence to be part of the greater church and to be
bound by
its governing documents. These governing documents make clear that
church
property is held in trust for the general church and may be controlled
by the
local church only so long as that local church remains a part of the
general
church. When it disaffiliated from the general church, the local church
did not
have the right to take the church property with it.”
Church
Employment
Disputes:
The
First
Amendment and the
ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine preclude (prohibit, prevent) civil courts from inquiring into
ecclesiastical matters.
For
example,
courts may not
generally consider employment
disputes between a religious organization and its clergy (see Ministerial
Exception) because such
matters
necessarily involve questions of internal church discipline, faith, and
organization that are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law.
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila,
280 U.S.
1, 16 (1929); Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1168.
Whether
an
individual is
qualified to be a clergy member
of a particular faith is a matter to be determined by the procedures
and
dictates of that particular faith. Gonzalez,
280 U.S.
at 16.
Religious Grounds for
Limiting Employment Opportunities That Are Protected By
Anti-Discrimination Laws:
Federal
law
prohibits
discrimination in employment on the
basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or age. 42
U.S.C.
§
2000e-2; 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
California
and other
states non-discrimination laws are similar, but also may prohibit
discrimination on
other grounds.
California
Government Code §12921:
The
opportunity
to seek,
obtain, and hold employment
without discrimination because of race, religious creed, color,
national
origin, ancestry,
physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition,
genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity,
gender
expression, age, or sexual orientation is hereby
recognized as and
declared to
be a civil right.
Due
to the religious protections of the First
Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, the
government protects of church autonomy (self-governance). Thus, governments
generally do not interfere
with church hiring practices.
Federal
law allows religious
organizations to
consider a person’s religious beliefs in hiring for all positions.
McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
And for hiring clergy (see Ministerial
Exception), none of the federal
non-discrimination regulations apply. Id.
at 558-61; Scharon
v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d
360
(8th Cir. 1991).
And
under California
law, per the
CA Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), i.e.,
CA Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.,
religious nonprofit organizations are
entirely exempt from these
various
nondiscriminatory regulations. See California
Government Code § 12926(d).
In McKeon
v. Mercy
Healthcare Sacramento (1998)
19 Cal.4th 321 (McKeon), the CA Supreme Court determined that
a hospital
controlled by the Roman Catholic Church could invoke the
religious-entity
exemption even though not officially incorporated as
a nonprofit religious corporation
under Corporations Code
section 9110 et seq.
If
an employer is
qualified
as a nonprofit religious
association or corporation, it will be exempt from CA FEHA regardless
of
the
nature of the employee’s job or the type of discrimination it allegedly
practiced. Kelly v.
Methodist Hospital
of Southern Cal.
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1108,
1119.
Therefore, if a
church
considers any protected grounds in
its decision to hire based on its beliefs, its bylaws
should so clearly
state
those beliefs (for example, a church that allows only male pastors,
elders and deacons). See related article: Christians
and
Lawsuits
Author: Christian Attorney Matthew
B. Tozer
Disclaimer
Copyright
2012. All rights
reserved
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